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BOOK REVIEWS
OUR ELE-EN CHIEF JUSTICES: A HISTORY OF THE SUPREMEI COURT IN
TERMS OF THEiR PERSONALITIES. By Kenneth Bernard Umbreit. New York
and London: Harper and Brothers, 1938. Pp. xiv, 539.
"Curiously enough," writes the author in his prologue, "while there is
a widespread belief that constitutional decisions can be interpreted in terms
of judicial biography, there is almost no such thing as judicial biography."
He finds that while the Chief Justices have fared better than the Associates,
even as to the former there is a dearth of writing and some of that is not
readily available. "This volume is an attempt to bring that material together, to analyze and sift it, and to reduce it to usable form." The result
is a series of essays dealing with the environmental influences operating
upon the men who successively became Chief Justice, their education for
the bar, professional attainments and political pursuits, a few anecdotes,
and something of their work on the Court. The compilation is based entirely upon published books and articles, and even here the author has not
ranged far. Still the casual reader, whose familiarity with the names of
the Chief Justices may not extend further than Marshall and Hughes, would
derive some acquaintance with eleven different personalities.
Mr. Umbreit regards the Chief Justices as "the eleven men who on the
whole have been most influential in the development" of the Court1 and,
by the sub-title, describes his work as "A History of the Supreme Court
in Terms of Their Personalities." It may be said at the outset that the
author has signally failed to achieve this purpose. Perhaps it could not
have been attained in a single volume of essays. In reading the book-just
as when one surveys the busts of the Chief Justices adorning the Supreme
Court chamber-one feels that the list of the really great figures in the
annals of the Court and the roster of its presiding officers have only a few
names in common. "Jay wrote only one important opinion as Chief Justice * * * ."2 Rutledge "never attended a single session" of the Supreme
Court while Associate Justice3 and wrote only one opinion during his
momentary Chief Justiceship.4 Ellsworth "wrote, all told, less than a dozen
opinions for the Supreme Court and none of these was in an important
case." 5 It is practicable to use Marshall and, to a lesser degree, Taney to
carry the history of the Court from the Jefferson to the Lincoln administration. But thereafter the scheme becomes quite unsatisfactory. Giants
such as Miller, Field, Bradley, and Harlan, Stone and Cardozo, are named
incidentally as having been on the Court, but the reader is given no idea
of what they were doing there. Doubtless they were lending a hand to the
Chief Justice. Holmes and Brandeis are referred to several times, but
without any serious attempt to explain their significance.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

P. xii.
P. 44.
P. 74.
P. 77.
P. 103.
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There has been no effort to trace the major lines of constitutional adjudication. Thus in the discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden 6 we are introduced
to the problem whether Congress had been given an exclusive or a concurrent power over interstate commerce. But the chapter on Taney contains
no mention of the Cooley Case,1 where the formula for its solution was
announced. If anything has happened to the commerce clause since Marshall
left it, the reader must eke out the information from such isolated statements as that White, C. J., agreed with the majority that Congress had
no power to close the channels of interstate commerce to child-made goods.
The result of the Slaughter-House Cases 8 is stated briefly but with no
subsequent attempt to show what the Fourteenth Amendment came to mean
in the American governmental system. Lochner v. New York9 is dismissed
in three lines as reflecting Fuller's static conception of constitutional law.
The Granger Cases' are cited several times, with Waite's pronouncement
that "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort
to the polls, not to the courts."'" But Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. V. Minnesota,12 where the reasonableness of rates was made a judicial question, is

never discussed.
Nor can it be said that even with the Chief Justices is their judicial
philosophy set out in such a systematic manner as to afford any clear impression. Disparate matters are thrown together without rational unity.
For example, in a single paragraph on Waite, 13 we are informed that the
Chief Justice regarded government as an organism rather than a contractual status; that he held invalid some Republican legislation on reconstruction; that he dissented from Justice Miller's opinion in United States
v. Lee,4 which held that an action of ejectment would lie against an officer
holding under claim of title in the United States; and that he also dissented
where Miller spoke for the Court in United States v. Rauscher,15 holding
that, in the absence of convention to the contrary, a person could not be
tried for an offense different from that for which he was extradited. Another paragraph' 6 sets out to show how Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' liberality in regard to the delegation of power to administrative officers reached
the breaking point in the Schechter Case'7 and Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan' 8-in the midst of which discussion it is recorded that he spoke for a
unanimous Court in holding that the government has power to punish a
citizen who refuses to return from abroad when summoned as a witness.' 9
6. (1824) 9 Wheat. 1.
7. Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851) 12 How. 299.
8. (1873) 16 Wall. 36.
9. (1905) 198 U. S.45.
10. (1877) 94 U. S. 113, 155, 165, 179, 180.
11. 94 U. S. at 134.
12. (1890) 134 U. S.418.
13. Pp. 321-322.
14. (1882) 106 U. S.196, 223.
15. (1886) 119 U. S. 407.
16. P. 492.
17. (1935) 295 U. S.495.
18. (1935) 295 U. S.388.
19. Blackmer v. United States (1932) 284 U. S. 421.
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It is evident more than once that the author has given only an inattentive reading to a case on which he comments. But the most egregious
blunder occurs in a passage 2o which announces that Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes has shown an unexpected willingness to allow administrative officers
to make judicial determinations. In support of this conclusion the opinion
in Crowellv. Benson2 ' is discussed. To quote, with necessary corrections in
brackets:
Shortly after he took his seat he was called upon to pass on the
validity of the broad powers committed to administrative officials by
the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act of 1927.
That act was, in effect, a workmen's compensation act for laborers
whose employment brought them within the admiralty jurisdiction of
the central government. In the case which reached the Court the
alleged employer claimed that the alleged employe was not employed
by him. The deputy commissioner to whom the administration of the
act was entrusted found that he was. The employer wished to re-try
the question of employment in the district court. The opinion denied
[affirmed] this right and upheld the constitutionality of the act (only
after the section attempting to make administrative findings of fact
conclusive had been emasculated in deference to the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment] * * * . Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom
Justices Stone and Roberts concurred, dissented on this very point of
the finality of the commissioner's finding [because they did not agree
that the employer was entitled to a trial de novo].22
The author does not mention the analogous case of St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 23 where the Chief Justice, speaking for five members
of the Court, elaborately supported the proposition that due process requires
an independent judicial review of the facts where rates fixed by an administrative authority are challenged as confiscatory.
In the chapter on Mr. Chief Justice Hughes the reader finds no intimation that the course of legislative and administrative action after 1933
resulted in any unusual demonstration of judicial power. Some New Deal
cases are cited here and there, but with no suggestion that they were
anything more than the ordinary run of the mill. The A. A. A. Case, 24
Ashwander v. T. V. A.,25 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,26 West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,27the N. L. R. B. cases, 28 and decisions upholding social security
legislation- are completely ignored. Nor does the author so much as men20. P. 491.
21. (1932) 285 U. S. 22.
22. Pp. 491-492.
23. (1936) 298 U. S. 38.
24. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1.
25. (1936) 297 U. S.288.
26. (1936) 298 U. S. 238.
27. (1937) 300 U. S.379.
28. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
(1937) 301 U. S. 1; National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer
Co. (1937) 301 U. S. 49; National Labor Relations Board v. FriedmanHarry Marks Clothing Co. (1937) 301 U. S. 58; Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board (1937) 301 U. S. 103; Washington, V. & M. Coach
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1937) 301 U. S. 142.
29. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 301 U. S. 548; Helvering v.
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tion the fight over the Court reorganization proposal, wherein Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes' letter to Senator Wheeler played so important a part.
If a work on judicial biography is really to exhibit "a cross-section of
American history cut at a new angle,"' 30 it will have to be a much more
powerful performance than is here exhibited.
CHARLEs FAimA.jLAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE. By Esther Lucille Brown.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1938. Pp. 302.
As the fifth in its current series of studies of professional life in the
United States, the Russell Sage Foundation trains its sociological microscope on the legal profession and reports the results of its impartial investigation of the data available. Lawyers and the Promotion of Justice deals
with the relation of the legal profession to society in terms of the interest
and activity of the organized bar in the promotion of justice. The picture,
as those alert to the problems of organized bar activity will readily admit,
is not entirely pleasant, nor is it altogether hopeless. The primary value
of this study lies in the objective focus provided by the lay point of view;
and yet this virtue contributes to the major weakness of the observations
set forth by taking statistics at their face value and placing too great
reliance on purely objective analysis of factual data that is not always complete, without going behind the results to inquire more deeply into the
causes. This is not to say that the analysis of the data here presented is
without worth or meaning, but simply to point out that a more penetrating
study might have made possible a more faithful rendering of the subject
at hand.
Take, for example, the observations of the author with regard to the
treatment of grievance complaints by the organized bar. No one is more
acutely aware of the shortcomings of bar grievance procedure than the
conscientious bar association executive, and no one would be more willing
to conduct vigorous prosecution of well-founded complaints than the average
bar assciation committee on grievances. A principal reason for these apparent shortcomings is simply that bar organizations lack the funds necessary to carry on investigations and hearings of these complaints. Until
those funds are made available, their work in these fields will continue to
be restricted. In the major metropolitan centers these funds are frequently
available, and it is in these areas that grievance prosecution reaches its
greatest effectiveness.
The author, however, overlooks this obvious situation and blames the
lack of adequate grievance machinery upon a supposed indifference of the
bar to the social implications of continued unethical practices. Granted the
hesitance of individual lawyers to prosecute their professional brethren,
there is no such lack of social responsibility on the part of state grievance
Davis (1937) 301 U. S. 619; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.
(1937) 301 U. S. 492.
30. P. xiv.
t Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.
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